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Abstract We examine how corporate governance changes over the industrial life cycle when places
commit firms to certain governance structures. Focus is on industries where a significant part of
the economic value is created by technological knowledge changing the conditions for corporate
financing. The article extends this view to include knowledge needed to accumulate governance
capabilities. The board is a crucial governance institution emphasized in the study. We find that
changes in this institution depend on shareholders’ concern regarding innovation management.
We also find that boards are changed over time to improve the conversational exchange, which is
attained by extending the boards with directors holding degrees in engineering. The main finding is
that the most successful firms recruit board members from the geographic setting in which they
were founded at all stages of the industrial life cycle. The Danish wind turbine industry serves as
empirical evidence.
Keywords: Corporate governance, board, industrial life cycle, firm-specific knowledge, geographic
place.
1 Introduction
The history of a company is tied to a certain place. This has been recognized by geographers who raise
the question regarding “the placement of firms”, suggesting that geographic settings produce different
types of firms (Dicken 2000). This is particularly evident when looking beyond large adolescent firms.
Properties of places where firms are founded influence the accumulation of knowledge which make them
grow into competitive firms. The view of a place as a corporate reservoir of technological knowledge needs
to be extended to knowledge needed to accumulate governance capabilities. This article aims to examine
changes in corporate governance over time when properties of the geographic location commit companies
to certain governance structures. The relatively under-researched knowledge dimension is the lens through
which we look at ties between governance, places, and time. The share of human capital is significant in
most companies and the replacement of physical capital by its human counterpart implies a qualitative
change in corporate financing that has triggered scholarly discussions about the appropriateness of the
shareholder value model that stresses the accountability perspective on corporate governance (monitoring
and control) (Rajan & Zingales 2000). In writing this article, we have been inspired by Short et al.
(1999) and Filatotchev and Wright (2005) who move the corporate governance focus away from the
accountability perspective by suggesting approaches that encompass the enterprise aspects of governance.
Before investing in a company, owners and investors carefully deliberate the business value that is derived
from the development of the internal resources and the growth potential.
In particular, we look into consequences of the geographic setting for understanding the enterprise
aspects of governance. It can be referred to scholars researching how corporate governance varies between
countries depending on national systems. A majority of these scholars apply the accountability perspective
and highlight how the protection of shareholders by a country’s legal system influences corporate
governance (La Porta et. al. 2000; La Porta et. al. 1999). Others apply a slightly different perspective
addressing the embedments of governance in national systems when shareholders take active part in
formulating corporate strategies. Kogut and Walker (2001) enquire into the German system characterized
by ownership links between firms combining to form “small worlds” of stratigizing actors that emerge from
regional networks with local banks playing an important role. The authors find that the “small worlds”
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are robust to adjustments to remain competitive and resist global economic pressures. In the same vein,
Kogut (2012) argues that the national systems emerge from micro-behavior. This behavior is guided by
particular generating rules that derive from social relations between investors and entrepreneurs, who can
formally be bound through boards of directors. Even if national systems remain, there is plasticity in the
governance structure as technological templates influence strategic actions (Kogut & Walker 2001). These
structures are formed by rules that tend to attract and select board members with higher education.
According to Kogut (2012), there are also multiple studies showing that the recruitment is conditioned by
homophily, i.e. a tendency for people to have ties with people who are similar to themselves in socially
significant ways. Homophily is often associated with people living together in the same place, usually in
smaller places than countries. In this article, we examine in depth how governance structures emerge
when investors and entrepreneurs are geographically fragmented.
Although researchers have inquired into changes in corporate governance when actors are strategizing,
changes have followed the organizational life cycle (Clark 2007; Zahra & Hayton 2005; Filatotchev &
Wright 2005). Research has mostly neglected the critical topic of industry dynamics and how the evolution
of governance is connected with technological competition in single sectors. This article tries to fill this
gap. The way competition within industries evolves over time, as expressed by the industrial life cycle,
becomes central to our exploratory activities (Yamamora & Sonobe & Outsaka 2005), (Klepper 1996),
(Cohen & Klepper 1992), (Gort & Klepper 1982). We argue that competition within an industry is
mastered by innovation management, and corporate governance is shaped by financiers’ concern about
innovation. In addition, more researches are needed to address the influence the location of corporate
activity has on the governing of innovation management. Significant research addresses the importance
of specific geographic places as sources of core competencies needed for firms’ competitive performance
(Werker & Athreye 2004; Asheim & Gertler 2006). Research also shows how corporate governance is
improved if residents, where a company attracts and generates knowledge, are invited to the boardrooms
(Bottazzi, Da Rin & Hellmann 2009; Audretsch, Keilbach & Lehmann 2006). Yet, more researches are
needed regarding consequences of governance in companies that depend on places when managing their
competitive situation. This article tries to make a contribution to this under-researched area.
The corporate governance system includes a wide range of institutions such as the board of directors,
ownership structures, formal institutions for judicial power, and governance institutions that safeguard a
reliable and transparent accountancy. The point of departure of this article is that the control rights are
allocated to the shareholders. This allocation of the residual control rights can rightly be questioned (cf.
Aglietta & Rebérioux 2005). In stretching the interpretation of this control, we link up with the team
production theory of the firm that makes efficient governance systems synonymous with the protection
of the interests of all stakeholders that invest in the core competencies of a company (Machold et. al.
2011), (Huse & Gabrielsson 2008), (Blair 1998). Further, the board of directors has a critical function
as mediator between a firm’s value-adding stakeholders. As Huse and Gabrielsson (2008) show board
members’ involvement in the strategic decision making process becomes crucial for corporate innovation.
While the board also is a vital corporate governance institution, we choose the board of directors as
indicator of the state of corporate governance (dependent variable). However, the research has mostly
ignored how boards of directors are adjusted to accommodate changes when the industrial life cycle
proceeds from one competitive stage to another, and when properties of geographic places have an impact.
The present article tries to fill this gap.
We use a single-case study of wind turbine production to inductively propound propositions and ideas
that push forward extant theories about relationships between geographic places, technological competition
and corporate governance (boards). Since the purpose is to develop theory, not to test it, large-sample
evidence to run proper statistical analyses is not needed. By choosing an industry characterized by intense
technological competition, we have sampled a case particularly suitable for illuminating and extending the
relationships examined in the study. Although previous studies have used buyouts as empirical evidence to
inquire into investors’ concern about innovation management, the consequences for governance have been
of less frequent inquiry. Lerner et. al. (2008) find that after certain types of buyout, such as private equity
investments, firms pursue more economically important innovations as measured by patent citations.
Hellmann and Puri (2000) point out that venture capital involvement leads to a shorter time for a firm to
bring a product to the market, and firms pursuing an innovator strategy instead of an imitator strategy
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are more likely to obtain venture capital financing. Likewise, Zahra and Hayton (2005) find that R&D
investments are positively associated with venture capitalist involvement at the start-up stage of a firm.
This inductive case study has the ability to offer insights into the complex patterns of responses by
new governance structures in connection with buyouts, which theory-testing cannot easily reveal. It is
reported to develop a richer understanding of how changes in board institutions are linked to shareholders’
concern about changes in competition over the industrial life cycle. A question that arises is if the most
successful firms assign high values to board members’ geographic proximity to firm-specific knowledge
and recruit board members from the geographic setting in which the firms were founded. Section 2 is
devoted to a survey of our point of conceptual departure. After a discussion about scientific methods,
research context and data in section 3, section 4 is devoted to the presentation of our analyses and results,
while section 5 is a discussion about the results and sums up our main conclusions.
2 A Brief Survey of Problems
The industrial life cycle
The internal structure of national systems of corporate governance reflects historical bargain between
labor, the state and holders of capital regarding the structuring of the financing and governance of large
corporations (Kogut & Walker 2001). The systems are sectorially fragmented, besides being regionally
fragmented. When industries are new, entry is massive. Competition focuses on product innovation as
many firms offering different product variants enter the market. Since the producers constantly learn how
to improve the products, the number of product opportunities erodes, entry slows, and exit overtakes
entry. Meanwhile, a dominant design and routinized technological regime appear (Klepper 1996). When an
industry is young and still complies with an entrepreneurial technological regime external shareholders face
severe difficulties in assessing the proper value of companies. Steps to obtain more accurate information
about the business value can effect the type of governance. While the calculation of the commercial risk
is made by the investor, there is usually a close connection between the founder and the CEO (sometimes
the same person) and in Reid’s and Smith’s wording “they may feel they know they have the best scientist,
the best invention, the best new product design, but they do not know how to value this” (Reid & Smith
2008 p. 30). At later stages of the industrial life cycle, the prominence of one dominant design facilitates
the assessment of business values.
Competition is intensified over the industrial life cycle. Intensified competition is caused by the
appearance of a dominant design, which implies that the potential market for a distinct company
increases. Increased firm growth increases the demand for financing, which cannot be satisfied without
changes in the ownership structure. Corporate control moves from insiders to external investors (see
Clark 2007) and corporate governance changes from pursuing enterprise aspects to an accountability
perspective (Short et al. 1999), (Filatotchev & Wright 2005). Yet, it seems as if existing research does not
address changes in governance to the extent they deserve. For instance, the transition to the routinized
technological regime implies a change in the knowledge conditions of technology as the importance of
accumulated non-transferable market experience increases. Firms entering a market cannot possess this
experience (Audretsch & Fritsch 2002). In other words, and as already mentioned, this transition facilitates
calculations of the economic value of investments in new technology, which is an advantage for external
investors, who rely on financial accounts and financial evaluations of a business. However, the possibility
of letting outsiders share internally accumulated market experience, and to transact knowledge about
the economic value of internal intangible assets, is limited. Transfers of corporate control to external
directors are restricted at later stages of the industrial life cycle as it is necessary to take competition
interests into consideration. Due to competitive pressure, provision of information in financial accounts
is circumscribed by the sensitivity of the value of trade secrecy. Reid and Smith (2008) conclude that
disclosure in published accounts could be seen as providing too much information to rivals.
This survey hints that governance by outside discipline and monitoring by investors and owners is not
always efficient. Allen and Gale (1998) find that there are firms that compete efficiently in international
markets and conclude that firms can generate return for shareholders even if standard corporate governance
mechanisms are inefficient. Their explanation is the dynamic competition in product markets where firms
survive competition because of entrepreneurial management teams that do more than cost minimize or
act as stand-ins for shareholders. It is reasonable to conclude that there is a lack of viable theory and of
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empirical evidence of how governance changes over the industrial life cycle. In this article, we argue, and
illustrate empirically, that there is more in this topic than just a matter of changing corporate governance
from enterprise aspects to compliance with the accountability perspective at later stages of the cycle.
The knowledge dimension and business value
For industries with a high rate of human capital accumulation, Rajan and Zingales find a new task to
be performed by the directors: “to protect its /the company’s/ integrity” (2000, p. 222). Human capital
is more mobile than physical capital implying that the corporate governance system loses power, and the
entity being governed becomes indistinct. Audretsch (1995) and Toms and Filatotchev (2005) associate this
task with conflicts concerning strategies. We argue that the evolution of corporate governance depends on
how the task to protect the integrity is performed and agree with Short et al. (1999) and Filatotchev and
Wright (2005) that scholars usually overstate the task to monitor management. In doing that, they neglect
shareholders’ concern regarding the business value deriving from the control over internal knowledge
assets and the company growth potential.
Scholars sometimes argue that a company’s principal knowledge assets are created early and is difficult
to change afterwards (Kaplan et. al. 2009), (Klepper 1996), (Cohen & Klepper 1992). If this argument is
correct, concern for the enterprise aspects should be concentrated on the early stage of the industrial
life cycle. However, inquiries into the motorcycle industry in Japan show that the number of qualitative
improvements of the product increases at later stages of the life cycle (Yamamora & Sonobe & Outsaka
2005). Studies of the machine tool industry in Taiwan and the motorcycle industry in Germany and in
the UK show similar results. Gort and Klepper (1982), on the other hand, find that output of useful
innovations by US producers of new products increases at the early stages of the life cycle and decreases
subsequently. Contrary to Cohen and Klepper (1992), some scholars argue that expertise is not acquired
randomly but is deliberately extended. Companies investing in R&D increase the information about
innovative opportunities as well as the capability to absorb this type of information. Through boosting
the supply of innovative opportunities, investments in R&D will be further increased by incentives to
invest in absorptive capability; especially at later stages of the industrial life cycle when the supply is
large (Cohen & Levinthal 1989).
Existing theory does neither offer a satisfactory answer to the question of when companies’ knowledge
assets are created nor how the performance of the integrity task causes changes in governance over time.
This article tries to make a contribution to the theory by looking into how governance responds when the
type of conflict about technology varies over the stages of the industrial life cycle. Audretsch (1995) argues
that technological capability is lost at the early stage of the industrial life cycle, owing to the fact that the
corporate governance system is unable to settle conflicts about innovation management. These conflicts
concerning the value of innovations give employees with new ideas an incentive to leave and set up their
own firms. At later stages of the cycle, where firms compete in accumulating firm-specific knowledge, it is
difficult to create governance systems that can protect the financiers from knowledge leakage caused by
the mobility of qualified employees (Rajan & Zingales 2000), (Zingales 2000), (Estevevez-Abe, Iversen
& Soskice 2001). Altogether, these conflicts reduce the business value of investments, which requires
remedial action to reform governance.
Boards of directors
Research about the role of boards for managing companies’ integrity has the potential of being
integrated into a theory of timely changes in corporate governance. The team production theory looks
promising (Machold et. al. 2011), (Blair 1998). It views the firm as a nexus of team-specific assets
invested by various stakeholders, who profit from team production. Instead of contracting with each other
about shares in team production, team members transfer decision-making about duties and rewards to a
“mediating hierarchy” (Machold et. al. 2011 p 370). In real firms, this function is performed by the board,
which is a team that co-produces values, where the board members contribute with different knowledge
and skills. To sustain authority over valuable resources, boards build complementarities: links with which
the employees and the company can create more value together “...than they can by going their own
separate ways” (Rajan & Zingales 2000 p. 215). Employee ownership can incentivize the employees to
invest in firm-specific skills. Likewise, complementarities are created if skilled workers are offered stock
options and shares.
Becker (1964) argues that companies that pay marginally above the market wage for the employee’s
marketable skill pay fully for the company-specific skill, and the shareholders therefore appropriate the
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full return on the investments. As Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice (2001) point out, the acquisition of
firm-specific knowledge implies that the employees’ marketable skills may deteriorate if not used and
they will not be upgraded at the same rate as among the employees who practise them daily. We argue
that compensation for increased risk, when the marketable skills deteriorate, is necessary to consolidate
the long term growth potential of a company. Yet, this does not generally serve short term shareholder
interests, but a board acting as a “mediating hierarchy” is needed. Blair (1998) concludes that the board of
directors and the management are responsible for maximizing the wealth-creating potential of companies.
The employees are much more motivated to find new ways to innovate or cut costs if they know that
managers and directors listen to them. Likewise, Huse and Gabrielsson (2008) argue that the interests of
all stakeholders that make up the core competencies of the corporation should be protected and the board
of directors is a critical coordinating body that represents and mediates between all the stakeholders who
add value.
Blair (1998), Huse and Gabrielsen (2008) and Machold et. al. (2011) convince us that focusing on
boards can provide significant insights into our research questions. They concentrate on properties boards
must have to encourage all value-creating stakeholders to stay in a company and create more value.
Firstly, the board members should deliberately influence corporate innovations by getting involved in
strategic decision-making processes. Secondly, they should comply with a process-oriented boardroom
culture based on “discussions related to diverse knowledge inputs and the existence of potential opposing
view points, and where the boards represent a diverse set of stakeholders in and around the firm” (Huse &
Gabrielsson 2008, p. 8). However, the way board properties, that denote the state of corporate governance,
are adjusted to the need for developing growth opportunities that changes with the competitive stages
of the industrial life cycle has been the subject of less frequent inquiry. The ignorance of this topic is
critical as research reveals that the conditions for communicative exchange at the boards depend on
type of technological regime. This regime changes over the life cycle with significant consequences for
the dialogues in the boardrooms as well as for the dialogues with the stakeholders in- and outside the
companies.
Impact of places
A plausible theory is lacking in how governing the development of growth opportunities through the
industrial life cycle depends on ties that the companies’ value-creating stakeholders have to a geographic
place. Existing theories have usually highlighted corporate governance performance in national systems
without considering spatial decomposition into smaller geographic units than countries (see Kogut 2012,
Kogut & Walker 2001, La Porta et. al. 2000; La Porta et. al. 1999). A Scandinavian study of governance
uncovers networks of highly connected directors, but theory and empirical evidence exploring how the
recruitment of business groups is conditioned by homophily inside geographic spaces are lacking (Sinani
et al. 2008). Studies of financial market development suggest that venture capital formation is a highly
localized activity, and investing at a distance is something venture capitalists tend to avoid (Bottazzi, Da
Rin & Hellmann 2009). The authors do not raise the question about which type of quality the board
directors must have to express the perspectives of the different value-creating stakeholders, when the
stakeholders are more or less tied up to a geographic place.
Short et al. (1999) conclude that outside directors may ignore the enterprise aspects of governance.
Inside directors are more inclined to promote innovation strategies based on internal technological
competencies. We try to argue that they, for the most part, are recruited from the place, where the
company generates and attracts technological knowledge. They are able to interpret information regarding
technology that is difficult to assess in a financial sense. Zahra and Hayton (2005) report that a high
share of inside directors is conductive to high R&D spending and new product introduction. Outside
directors serving on the board have no significant effect on innovative performance. Representation in the
boardroom of the founders of a company also encourages innovative performance. They understand the
need to support R&D as a means of creating value. The functional and educational diversity of board
members also turn out to enhance innovation.
Previous discussions suggest that enterprise aspects are crucial during early stages of the industrial life
cycle. The entrepreneurial technological regime makes it difficult to asses proper values to companies. It is
reason, therefore, to believe that outside directors are disqualified and board directors should be more or
less tied up to places, where a company creates and absorbs its technological knowledge. Inside directors
are also needed in the boards at later stages of the cycle. They are capable of motivating the value-creating
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stakeholders to stay in a company and create more value as they usually live in the same place and
belong to the same social and professional communities. Inside directors make up teams (together with
managements) that can take advantage of agglomeration factors such as concentrations of place-based
knowledge that is immobile over long distances. Externalities that assume the shape of knowledge spillover
are present and imply that firm-specific knowledge is not used by one firm, but it is also used by other
firms within a region (Werker & Athreye 2004; Asheim & Gertler 2006). Knowledge spillover is common
at late stages of thew cycle and derives from employees who personify the knowledge and move between
working places in a regional labour market (Fosfuri & Rønde 2004). Knowledge creating firms, benefiting
from being located in close proximity to communities with research output, improve their governance by
inviting members of these communities into their boardrooms (Audretsch, Keilbach & Lehmann 2006).
Human capital is more mobile than physical capital and the migration of skilled employees is sometimes
a sign that corporate governance systems have lost power. Technological externalities make the definition
of the value adding stakeholders blurry with implications for the work in the boardroom. The mobility of
human capital increases in clusters, while peoples’ unwillingness to move over long distances prevents
technology from diffusing out of a cluster (cf. Brenner & Fornahl 2008). Consequently, the maximization
of the total wealth-creating potential of the enterprises becomes increasingly difficult. Audretsch (1995)
points out that skilled workers leave because of an inability of the board and the CEO to assess the value
of new ideas. Assessments would likely become more efficient with inside, place-based directors, who have
firm-specific knowledge.
3 Data and Method
With the aim to develop theory regarding changes in corporate governance compelled by the geographic
location, we use inductive reasoning applied to a longitudinal case study. This method is appropriate for
theory building (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). Since the research tries to push extant theory forward, not
to test existing theory, this method enables us to select a case that is particularly suitable for illuminating
and extending relationships and logic among constructs. If chosen with care, a case study serves the
purpose of our study, because it enables us to use rich empirical data from close investigations of buyouts
and their impact on boards. Like what other scholars using cases for theory building have done before
us, we started our study by collecting data from which we develop theory inductively (see for instance
Khanagha et. al. 2013). An industry producing with new technology - Danish wind turbine production -
was chosen as our case. Multiple sources of information were used such as documents provided by an
acknowledged consultant firm specialized in the provision of information about the wind energy sector1.
Supplementary information was obtained from the pan European data-base Amadeus, and from EU’s
research and development service Cordis.
In line with other researchers, we interpreted data and theory iteratively by initiating studies of
literature on corporate governance in companies, where the share of human capital is high. It was
evident that the literature had ignored critical topics about human capital, especially what human capital
implies for the interrelationships between governance and characteristics of places. This encouraged us to
continue and after each round of data collection and analysis, we returned to the literature and made new
interpretations in the light of the extant theory. In practice our results are based on a single-case study.
This makes our theory building less generalizable, but at the same time a single-case study is unusually
revelatory (cf. Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007)
This approach gives us the opportunity to describe buyouts and their impacts in depth. Data on
Danish wind turbine producers have been collected from various sources for the years 1979-2008, which
has simplified the empirical analysis as it enables us to make use of quantitative measures. To further
improve the empirical analysis, we also use interviews with board members and, thus, gain from combining
quantitative and qualitative methods. Neither method is superior to the other. Rather they are seen as
providing complementary data, where interviews with board members have been indispensable for making
a historical record of the buyouts, for convincing us about the importance of innovation management
for financiers investing in companies and for getting insights into conversations at the boards. For the
quantitative method, information regarding board members (by company), was gathered from the Central
1 The Danish consultancy company BTM Consult
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Business Register (CVR) at the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency2. Information regarding
ownership status was obtained from the same register where all stakes equal to, or larger than, 5% are
registered. The educational background of the board members and their home addresses were obtained
from bibliographies (“Kraks Blå Bog”) and from a questionnaire completed by a sample of directors,
who have been members of the various boards considered in the study. By this procedure it was possible
to identify board members by residence and by educational background either in natural sciences and
engineering or in economics (including business administration) and law3. Further, it was possible to
determine whether a member has completed upper secondary school or a university degree as his or her
top form. These and only these data are used in the case-study in the article
Corporate technological quality can be associated with the amount of technological expertise in a
company. Data on the number of employees holding a university degree in engineering or natural sciences
are obtained from Statistics Denmark for the whole lifetime of all wind turbine producers examined. It is
not satisfactory to use input of skilled labor as the sole measure of technological quality. Accordingly, these
data are used only to a small extent and never in conclusions about case studies of individual companies.
They only enter into overall conclusions about how all turbine manufacturers examined usually adjust
skilled labor in connection with buyouts (section 4.2) and how board structures are adapted to these
adjustments (section 4.3). Thus, a second measure of technological quality is applied based on types
of turbines produced by the companies. This is accomplished as wind turbine designs are categorized
into four main concepts based on publicly available data from each manufacturer according to principles
discussed below.
We have made a point of validating data through cross verification from various sources. Firstly, we
have combined documents, official statistics and interviews with board members involved at different
stages of the industrial life cycle. Secondly, information obtained, and results achieved, have continuously
been controlled for reasonableness with staff members of an acknowledged consultant firm specialized in
the provision of information about the wind energy sector4.
3.1 Case Selection
In admitting that the technological competition, which fluctuates through the industrial life cycle,
influences the answers to the research questions, we anchor the case study at the industry rather than
the firm level. By our decision to study an industry brimming with technological competition, we have
sampled a case particularly suitable for examining the research questions. For the purpose of taking a
long view, it was important that the industrial life cycle had already reached the late stage to assure that
changes in corporate governance institutions and in the technological quality of the firms have a recorded
history. Wind turbine production, which developed in the wake of the oil supply crisis in the 1970s,
is appropriate for this purpose. Another advantage of choosing this industry was that we could limit
data-collection to a group of Danish wind turbine producers. Denmark was the pioneering country, and
Danish turbine producers still have large market shares. This choice of industry also serves our purpose to
examine how properties of places affect corporate governance as the Danish production of wind turbines
is geographically concentrated to a region in Jutland, West Denmark. That is to say, geography plays a
role in the evolution of the Danish wind turbine industry and an examination of this industry may reveal
significant mechanisms through which geography influences on corporate governance.
Historical data about buyouts, boards, and the domicile of the directors have been collected for a
sample of turbine producers, which, however, includes the major Danish producers through time (table
1). Since these producers shaped the industry during this time, our data reflect changes in the state of
competition in a timely manner. Table 1 shows that a major part of the producers in the sample has left
the market either through M&A or by market exit, and there are only two companies left: Vestas Wind
Systems and Siemens Wind Power. It is also shown in the table how current firms, and firms that exit,
stepwise are shaped by M&A.
There are different ways of measuring success of a business. All firms in table 1 have not been successful
as some have either exited or been taken over by other turbine producers. In the paper, we try to argue
2 Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen
3 In addition, there were a few board members, who were classified as “others”
4 The Danish consultancy company BTM Consult
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Table 1. Danish producers of wind turbines examined in the article.
Current firms M&A Lifetime Nr.
Vestas/Vestas Wind Systems 1979 - 1-2
Danish Wind Technology 1981 - 1990 3
NEG-Micon 1997 - 2004 4
Micon 1983 - 1997 5
Nordtank/Nordtank
Energy Group 1979 - 1997 6-7
Wind World 1987 - 1998 8
Siemens Wind Power 2004 - 9
Bonus Energi 1979 - 2004 10
Exits from the market
Wincon West Wind (A/S Vestfrost) 1991 - 2002 11
Wincon 1986 - 1991 12
Danwin 1985 - 1992 13
Sources: BTM Consult and web sources
that organizing the control according to the shareholder value model is not necessarily successful. Control
by owners should also encompass consideration about the growth potential and technological competition
orchestrated through innovation management to be successful.
Technological competition
The amount of technological expertise is not the sole measure of corporate technological quality. A
second measure applied is based on pioneering work done to classify turbine models according to two
characteristics: the speed control ability and the power control ability of the turbines (Hansen & Hansen
2006). The market penetration of different wind turbine concepts is strongly influenced by the wind
turbines control abilities, i.e. by their capabilities to behave as active controllable components on the grid.
The most commonly applied wind turbine concepts, also depicting the technological quality of
the turbine producers, can be categorized into four main types (table 2). Type A denotes the fixed
speed controlled wind turbine, which is the conventional concept applied by many Danish wind turbine
manufacturers during the 1980s and 1990s. Besides an induction generator, the electrical system of
fixed speed wind turbines contains a soft-starter for smoother grid connection and a capacitor bank for
reactive power compensation. This concept has been very popular because of its relatively low price,
its simplicity and its robustness. Its disadvantages are mechanical stress, limited power quality control
and un-controllability of reactive power consumption. Type B corresponds to the limited variable speed
controlled wind turbine with variable generator rotor resistance, known as OptiSlip R© or FlexiSlip R©.
The idea of this concept is that it uses a wound rotor induction generator (WRIG) with a variable
additional rotor resistance which is controlled optically and changed dynamically by power electronics.
This type of wind turbine was promoted by Vestas Wind Systems since the mid 1990’s up to 2006. The
advantages of this concept compared to type A are a simple circuit topology and an improved operating
speed range. To a certain extent, this concept can reduce the mechanical loads and power fluctuations
caused by gusts. Some of the disadvantages are limited speed range and poor control of active and reactive
power.
Type C denotes the variable speed wind turbine concept with double-fed induction generator. It uses
a partial-scale power converter connected to the generator’s rotor typically through slip rings. The stator
is directly connected to the grid, while the rotor is connected through a partial-scale power converter.
This concept is more expensive than type A and type B, but it has a wider range of dynamic speed
control depending on the size of the power converter. The partial-scale converter makes this concept
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Table 2. Year of first time application of wind turbine concepts by producers.
Producer Lifetime Technology First time application
Vestas/Vestas Wind Systems 1979 - Type A 1981
Type B 1990
Type C 1997
Bonus Energi 1979 - 2004 Type A 1981
Nordtank/Nordtank Energy Group 1979 - 1997 Type A 1981
Danish Wind Technology 1981 - 1990 Type A 1981
Micon 1983 - 1997 Type A 1983
Danwin 1985 - 1992 Type A 1985
Wincon 1986 - 1991 Type A 1986
Wind World 1987 - 1998 Type A 1987
Wincon West Wind 1991 - 2002 Type A 1991
NEG-Micon 1997 - 2004 Type A 1997
Type C 2002
Siemens Wind Power 2004 - Type A 2004
Type D 2004
Source: Publicly available data on the newest wind turbines from each manufacturer
attractive from an economical point of view. Finally, type D corresponds to the full variable speed pitch
controlled wind turbine, with the generator connected to the grid through a full-scale power converter.
The presence of the full-scale converter implies extra losses in the power conversion, but it is gained by
the added technical performance. This concept has full control of the speed range from 0 to 100% of the
synchronous speed. It supports reactive power compensation and a smooth grid connection. However, it
has a higher cost and a higher power loss in the power electronic than Type C as all the generated power
has to pass through the power converter.
3.2 Measures of Governance
This article searches to explore how boards are adjusted, but it needs a measure of how this corporate
governance institution changes over the industrial life cycle. It is argued that changes are conditioned on
companies’ need of growing knowledge assets. Literature in the field of team production theory connects
this condition with a process-oriented boardroom culture, where boards give advice to CEO (Huse &
Gabrielsson 2008). One question arising is which types of board member are suitable for this kind of board
culture. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that a majority of the board directors should be independent,
but a review of literature suggests that no systematic relationship between independence of boards and
performance can be found (cf. Johnson et. al. 2012) Instead, Johnson et. al call attention to a growing
body of research about board members’ demographics, human and social capital. Like Zahra and Hayton
(2005) they find that director education, which is highly correlated with human and social capital, affects
innovative performance and, thus, should be included in our measure of changes in governance. However,
a process-oriented boardroom culture can be more or less useful for corporate innovations depending
on the conversational exchange, which concerns the board work as a whole. It is referred to Johnson et.
al. (2012), who caution against overlooking that board composition is endogenous and determined by
how various subgroups of directors can contribute to this conversation and influence on firm outcome.
From this perspective, it becomes dubious to use aggregate units such as educational level. A more
adequate approach looks at various educational groups at the board and if there are critical thresholds
with regard to representation below which individual groups will have no influence. A similar approach
was applied in a study in the UK, where Kirchmaier and Kollo (2006) find that professional directors are
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most likely to hold business degrees. Yet, as Kaufman and Englander (2005) argue, boards that maximize
the wealth-creating potential are comprised by directors, who can knowledgeably express the interests,
perspectives, and expertise of all value adding stakeholders. This viewpoint has been taken on board as
board members educated in natural sciences or engineering, who can speak for the skilled technicians, are
included in our governance measure (besides directors with an education in economics).
We measure the evolution of governance over the industrial life cycle using four board structures. Firstly,
these structures are based on information about the number of board members and their educational
background and, secondly, on conjectures about subgroup effects on board performance: Type A -
educational diversity - refers to boards that have at least one director with an educational background in
the natural sciences or engineering and at least one director with an educational background in economics
(including business administration) or law. If there is only one director with a particular educational
background on the board, his/her field of knowledge may not be considered by other board members.
Type B - symmetry of the conversational exchange - takes better account of subgroup effects by including
more than one director with a particular educational background. For boards with more than six members,
at least three must have an education in the natural sciences or engineering and at least three directors
must have an education in economics (including business administration) or law. If a board has six or less
members, two members for each group are sufficient. Learning among board members also depends on
educational specialization in the dimension of sophistication. Moderately specialized boards that combine
directors with high levels of education and directors with practical education within the same fields are
considered as preferable. A board is moderately specialized (type C) if there are two or more members on
the board who are educated in the natural sciences or engineering and two or more with an education in
economics (including business administration) or law. For each group, at least one director must have
completed upper secondary school as his or her top form and at least one director must have a university
degree.
These board structures can be arranged in a perfect hierarchy, used in this article to assess board
performance: boards of type B are superior to boards of type A as the conversational exchange in the
boardroom is not only symmetric, but the boardroom is also educationally diversified. Likewise, a board
structure of type C is superior to type B, as a moderately specialized board also allows for symmetric
conversational exchange. However, for boards with more than six members, a perfect hierarchy exists
only if there is a requirement for three board members (instead of two) of each educational group in the
type C structure. This typology of structures does not suit the smallest boards. Small boards (type D),
with less than four members, will be examined separately.
This article also needs a measure that relates board work to geographic places. We argue that corporate
governance is improved if board members are recruited in the same region as a company has its main
sources of technological knowledge and, therefore, it makes sense to distinguish between these directors and
board members recruited in other regions. We support the idea that the first type of director has capability
to express the perspectives of the different value-creating stakeholders, who are more or less linked to a
company’s home base. Probably, this geographical composition of boards is helped by homophily found in
multiple studies of board recruitment (cf. Kogut 2012). One question arising is if the need of place-based
directors changes over the stages of the industrial life cycle. In order to answer this question empirically,
we construct a measure of how investors searching corporate control assess directors recruited near to
the company home base as compared with directors recruited from remote places. We use a measure D1D2
to indicate how those in control of a company assess the geographical distance between board directors
(D1) as compared with board directors’ distance to the place, where the company generates and attracts
technological knowledge (D2). More specifically, D1 is equal to the average distance between the directors’
residences and the geographic centre of the residences and D2 is equal to the distance between the
geographic centre of the residences and the location of the headquarter of the company.
4 Analysis and Results
4.1 Buyouts
We started our case study by making historical records of the buyouts for each turbine manufacturer
in table 1. These records present the history of our case that offers opportunities to examine in depth
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investors’ reason for buyouts as well as adjustments in governance. Starting in 1946 as a manufacturer
of products for farming and domestic appliances, the founder of Vestas, who was a son of a well-known
local blacksmith, bought the rights to produce “Herborg-møllen” (the HVK turbine) in 1979. Vestas
was a family-owned company until it was hit by a crisis in 1986. Changes in governance were initiated
by a small group of people who knew one another, including a member of the founding family. These
managers and financiers carried out a management buyout, sold some businesses, and transferred the
manufacturing of turbines to a new company: Vestas Wind Systems. Before, another manufacturer, Danish
Wind Technology, was established by the Danish government, the Danish company Vølund and Swedish
ASEA in 1981. At the time for the management buyout of Vestas, the Danish government sold its stake
in Danish Wind Technology and Vestas Wind Systems, together with a utility company (SEAS), became
new owners of the company. The utility and a Danish pension fund (Lønmodtagernes Dyrtidsfond) also
bought stakes in Vestas Wind System in 1989 and the stage was prepared for the takeover of Danish
Wind Technology by Vestas Energy Systems through a buyout in 1990. In 1994, when the original owners
began to sell their stakes, a new group of mainly Dutch investors began to grow in importance5. Vestas
Wind Systems was introduced on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange in 1998 and the Dutch block holders
left in 1999.
Nordtank (established in 1979) is an offspring of a company producing tank lorries, and the main
part of its shares was controlled by the two founding fathers until it was stuck in a crisis in 1987. A
management buyout was carried out, but no dramatic change in the governance seems to have taken
place until the company was publicly traded at the Copenhagen stock exchange in 1994. It changed its
name to Nordtank Energy Group in 1987. Nordtank was the point of departure for a spin-off organized by
two engineers who set up Micon in 1983. A conflict between the two in 1986 led to Micon being split up
into two companies (Wincon and Wenergy). Wincon went through a couple of crises and a buyout in 1991
transferred the control over the company to a leading Danish producer of household appliances (A/S
Vestfrost) and it was renamed Wincon West Wind. The constellation of owners was the same throughout
the whole lifetime of Wincon West Wind which closed down in 2002.
The second engineer set up Wenergy which was renamed Micon in 1987. Before going out of business
in 1992, he tried to establish new leadership involving one of the world-leading contractors and operators
of medium and large diesel engine based power systems (Burmeister & Wain) which became a block
holder in 1989, but the stake was sold in 1992. In 1991, Vestervangen Holding replaced the founder step
by step and in 1994 the industrial group Schouw & Co. bought a quarter of the shares in Micon and later
increased this stake. The group already owned a significant stake in Nordtank Energy Group, and after
one year the CEO of Nordtank Energy Group took a seat on the board of Micon, heralding the fusion of
the two companies in 1997 and the establishment of NEG-Micon.
Wind World was set up as a spin-off from the original Vestas in 1986. A member of the founding
family of Vestas became the CEO, and equity capital was provided by an entrepreneur with domicile in
London and by Danish pension funds. Wind World was stuck in a crisis in 1997. It was restructured and
returned to the market as Wind World af 1997 and was finally bought by NEG-Micon in 1998. Schouw
& Co. continued to dominate NEG-Micon and it was obvious that plans were made for a takeover of
Vestas Wind Systems. In 1999, NEG-Micon ran into technical problems with turbine gear boxes and
suffered a crisis. The board was not informed in time and both the management and the chairman of the
board were fired. If the group of owners and managers of NEG-Micon made plans for buying Vestas Wind
Systems, these plans were abandoned. A change in strategy was looming, as Schouw & Co. in 2003 also
became a dominant owner of Vestas Wind Systems. The new strategy offered a platform for the group to
orchestrate a takeover of NEG-Micon by Vestas Wind Systems in 2004.
Another turbine producer, which also originated from a family of blacksmiths, is Bonus Energi. It
was family-owned from 1979 until it was sold to the German giant Siemens in 2004. After 2004, the
company was renamed Siemens Wind Power and was organized as a division subordinated to its owner
Siemens AG, but with a separate board. Finally, Danwin started as a spin-off from a shipyard (Helsingør
5 The group exercised control through holding companies such as Vestas Wind Systems Holding, Vestas Wind
Systems Holding II B.V. and Jopo II B.V. Vestas Wind Systems Holding, also made the new constellation
of owners a crucial block holder in the Spanish turbine producer Gamesa, already when this company was
established in 1993. No fusion was carried out, but, probably, the governance of the two companies was
coordinated.
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Skibsværft A/S), when the shipyard was closed in 1985. One person provided the whole capital and this
owner control did not change until Danwin went bankrupt and exited in 1992.
Table 3 sums up the exits and the buyouts from these historical records.
Table 3. Buyouts and exits by year. Numbers refer to companies in table 1
Year Exits Buyouts6
1986 1, 3, 5, 10
1987 6
1989 2, 5
1990 3, 8
1991 5, 12
1992 13
1994 2, 5, 7
1997 5, 7
1998 2, 8
2002 11
2003 2
2004 4, 10
Source: CVR at the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency
4.2 Enterprise Aspects of Governing Wind Turbine Production
At the early stage of the industrial life cycle, before 1992 when the companies still are young and governed
by a small number of founders, buyouts seem to depend on conflicts among the founders. Sometimes
one of the founders tries to consolidate his or her control over the company causing others to leave. The
internal technological resources are still scarce and the governance system is relatively closed to external
investors, whose concern and influence on the technological competencies of the companies are limited.
At this stage, the companies hire few engineers.
In 1990, Vestas Wind Systems introduced wind turbine concept B when owners and managers of the
company also orchestrated a takeover of Danish Wind Technology. It is tempting to conclude that the
turbine concept B was developed by Danish Wind Technology. Owners of Vestas Wind Systems were
worried about the future growth potential, but instead of supporting a strategy for the development of the
new technology in-house, they presumably assured that the technology needed was acquired externally.
One year before the listing on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, Vestas Wind Systems introduced the new
turbine concept C in 1997, likely to appeal to investors. In the same year, Micon and Nordtank Energy
Group merged, but this process started with a buyout in 1994, in which a constellation of owners, already
having a stake in Nordtank Energy Group, increased its control over Micon. The fusion between the two
companies was carried out and NEG-Micon was established when Vestas Wind Systems launched turbine
concept C in 1997. The new company succeeded launching turbine concept C in 2002 (cf. table 3).
Case evidence of buyouts provides support for the emerging theory that shareholders pay regards to
the development of the internal resources and the growth potential when making investment decisions,
which are motivated by deliberations on competition. Buyouts are sometimes carried out one or two
years before a significant takeover, which suggests that there are expectations among shareholders
regarding forthcoming takeovers inducing the need for preparations. According to the theory taking
shape, the adaptation of the growth potential to the competitive situation of companies is a vital factor
determining owners’ investments in companies. Empirical evidence showing that the number of engineers
employed increases significantly during these preparations supports this theory. Allen and Gale (1998)
consider dynamic competition in product markets orchestrated by entrepreneurial management teams as
a particular corporate control mechanism. They consider this mechanism as being different from corporate
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governance that rely on outside owners. Our empirical evidence of buyouts suggests something else,
leading us to conclude that owners interfere to satisfy companies’ need to adapt to dynamic competition.
This interference escalated after the buyout of Danish Wind technology by Vestas Wind Systems, which
marked the beginning of a new competitive stage of the industrial life cycle.
Empirical evidence from this study, that owners’ concern about innovations is growing after some
time, is contrary to scholars who argue that a dominant design appears early in the industrial life cycle
and the number of innovations decreases afterwards (Kaplan et. al. 2009), (Klepper 1996), (Cohen &
Klepper 1992), (Gort & Klepper 1982). The type A concept, which has been referred to as ’the Danish
concept’, was established early and widely used. However, the development of the wind turbine concepts
B, C and D took place later on, suggesting that innovation strategies continue to be important. The
theory supported by the current study is more in accordance with Yamamora et al. (2005) showing that
the number of qualitative product improvements increases at later stages of the life cycle. The probability
of survival is low for firms that continue to specialize in producing the type A concept. Two of them
exited from the market and two were taken over by other firms.
4.3 Coevolution of Governance and Competition
While the previous discussion highlights how owners carefully consider business value of technological
competencies before investing in companies, there is not yet a satisfactory theory about the impact on
corporate governance institutions. As advocates of the team production theory of the firm have discussed,
competencies are protected by the board, which is the governance institution responsible for maximizing
the wealth-creating potential of companies (Machold et. al. 2011), (Huse & Gabrielsson 2008), (Blair
1998). However, little emphasis has been put on how boards are adjusted to accommodate the need for
developing internal resources and growth opportunities when competition changes over the industrial
life cycle. Four board structures were developed to examine this topic (section 3.2). Information about
buyouts in table 3 is used to examine changes in the boards observed by comparisons of the board
structure before and after buyouts. Table 4 shows the changes for all observations in table 3. Except for
boards of type D, there are only three observations of buyouts (1986 (1), 1987(6) and 1989(2)) comprising
boards that do not qualify for the lowest ranked type A structure.
Before the technological race was initiated by Vestas Wind Systems launching turbine concept B
in 1990, owners’ concern about, and influence on, technological competencies are limited. Empirical
evidence of board structures suggests that small boards (type D) were common and usually retained
after a buyout. At this early stage of the industrial life cycle, the owners primarily view boards from
an accountability perspective. Thus, small boards usually include an economist or a lawyer with a
university degree suggesting that wind turbine firms had board directors with high competencies in
business administration early in their lifetime7,8. After the technological race started in 1990, changes
in the composition of boards after buyouts were common and engineers with an academic degree were
invited to sit on the board.
We try to argue, and will verify empirically, that changes in the board over time tend to improve the
conversational exchange to better suit owners’ concern about technological competition. For this purpose,
we use a proxy of efficient conversational exchange, which is defined using the four board structures in
section 3.2. To serve our purposes, we choose a proxy that represents the benefits of having directors
from various educational groups at the board as well as advantages of a representation for each group
above a critical threshold. Board structures B and C have these properties.
According to table 4, board structure B, which facilitates efficient conversational exchange between
directors who hold business degrees and directors holding degrees in engineering, becomes the dominant
board type. Data suggests that owner-interests in high technological quality are not expressed as claims
to specific board structures, but these structures are indirect effects of the shareholders’ concern about
innovation management. Hence, the empirical evidence shows that engineers begin to have chairs on the
7 When this competence was lacking on one of the boards, the founding father was replaced by the CEO, who
holds an academic degree in business administration.
8 High technological competencies could not replace these competencies as suggested by Danwin. Danwin exited
in spite of the fact that one of its three directors had a university degree in engineering. This firm is the only
one lacking a director with higher education in business administration.
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Table 4. Board structures before and after buyouts (exits).
Incident Board structure Board structure
Before9 After10
A B C D A B C D
1986(1) - x - - - - - -
1986(3) - x x - - x - -
1986(5) - - - x - x - -
1986(10) - - - x - - - x
1987(6) - - - - - - - -
1989(2) - - - - - x x -
1989(5) - - - x - - - x
1990(3) - - x - - x x -
1990(8) - - - x - - - x
1991(5) - - - x - - - x
1991(12) - x - - - x - -
1992(13) - - - x Exit - - - -
1994(2) - x x - - x x -
1994(5) - - - x - x - -
1994(7) - - - x - x - -
1997(5) x - - - - x - -
1997(7) x - - - - x - -
1998(2) - x x - - x - -
1998(8) - - - x - x - -
2002(11) - x - - Exit - - - -
2003(2) - x - - - x - -
2004(4) - x - - - x x -
2004(10) - - - x - - - x
Source: Questionnaire, CVR at the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency
board after the number of engineers involved in R&D has begun to grow. In effect, board discussions are
extended to encompass issues on technological designs (which are difficult to address unless there are
competent engineers on the board). Top-ranking boards, meeting the conditions for moderate specialization
(type C), were only found for Vestas Wind Systems and Danish Wind Technology11. Table 4 shows only
one occasion when a type C structure cannot be considered as superior to a type B (conditions for a B
type structure are not fulfilled): before the buyout 1990(3). No surprise, then, that the board was changed
after the buyout into a top-ranked type C board .
The theory that emerges from case evidence suggests, when the industrial life-cycle advances, boards
develop towards structures representing diverse stakeholders (cf. (Huse & Gabrielsson 2008) and (Blair
1998)). This result challenges dominant theories that a prominent design and a routinized technological
regime crystallize after some time (see (Klepper 1996), (Cohen & Klepper 1992), (Gort & Klepper 1982)).
Since a dominant design increases the possibilities for firm growth, the demand for financing increases,
which cannot be satisfied unless corporate control moves from insiders to independent, external directors
(see Clark (2007)). The pattern that appears from our study is slightly different as it suggests that
innovative activity continues to be important even at later stages of the life cycle. The most important
long term board structure found in our study agrees with the process-oriented boardroom culture suggested
by Huse and Gabrielsson (2008): diverse knowledge views are represented in board discussions that involve
engineers and include discussions about technological designs.
11 This is the highest ranked board structure in a perfect hierarchy (educationally diversified and moderately
specialised). Only for a short period immediately after Vestas Wind Systems was listed on the Copenhagen
stock exchange in 1998, the condition for moderate specialisation was not fulfilled.
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4.4 The importance of places
Over time, the geographical spread of the directors, and/or the distance between the centre of their
residences and the company, increase for a majority of the turbine producers (D1 and D2 in section
3.2 increase as time passes) (table 5). This geographical evolution can be interpreted as adaptations to
the competitive environment. Competent boards can only be recruited within a certain distance from
the headquarter. Vestas/Vestas Wind Systems and NEG-Micon are the only turbine producers, besides
Siemens Wind Power, that have developed turbine concepts B and C, which are more advanced than the
conventional design A. At the same time, they have a high D1D2 value suggesting that those in control of the
companies assign a high value to board members’ proximity to the source of technological knowledge. This
value was high already from the beginning and is still high at later stages of the industrial life cycle. Some
turbine producers show low D1D2 values (Wind World, Bonus Energi, Wincon West Wind, and Danwin,
which have all exited or been taken over by another firm) suggesting that the accountability perspective
has a higher priority. The importance of this perspective does not increase at later stages of the life cycle.
It should be noted that turbine producers with a low D1D2 value have either been outcompeted or have
been taken over by other turbine producers.
Table 5. D1, D2 and D1 
D2
by company. Distances in km and for the whole lifetime.
Current firms Distances Intermediate Beginning12 End13 D1
D2
Beg D1
D2
End
period
Vestas/Vestas Wind D1 4 - 126 4 100
Systems D2 3 - 179 3 39 1.33 2.56
Danish Wind D1 89 - 97 100 85
Technology D2 53 - 77 110 123 0.91 0.69
NEG-Micon D1 /14 71 73
D2 /15 38 42 1.87 1.74
Micon D1 39 - 76 12 68
D2 33 - 104 7 75 1.71 0.91
Nordtank/Nordtank D1 3 - 60 3 64
Energy Group D2 9 - 16 9 20 0.33 3.20
Wind World D1 0 16 0
D2 90 74 90 0.22 0
Siemens Wind
Power16
Bonus Energi D1 4 4 4
D2 6 6 6 0.67 0.67
Wincon West Wind D1 55 - 62 61 67
D2 102 - 103 103 102 0.59 0.66
Wincon D1 /17 20 20
D2 /18 11 11 1.82 1.82
Danwin D1 13 13 15
D2 19 19 16 0.68 0.94
Source: Questionnaire
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Now, we take the additional step to theorize that high D1D2 values depend on the fact that inside
directors living close to the headquarters are vital for efficient communication with the technical personnel.
That is, these directors are in a favorable position to motivate the stakeholders to stay in the company
and create more value. Inside directors are also capable of taking advantage of agglomeration factors such
as concentrations of place-based knowledge that is immobile over long distances and, therefore, difficult to
access for independent, external directors. Case evidence suggests that innovation management continues
to be an important aspect of owner control also at later stages of the industrial life cycle. Owners recruit
directors where the value-creating stakeholders live at later stages of the cycle as the supply of innovative
opportunities are significant at these stages of the industrial life cycle. In relying on Cohen and Levinthal
(1989), we conclude, as the return on absorptive capability for technology is high at the late stage, it
is in the interest of the financiers of companies that boards invest in R&D to increase this capability.
A necessary condition is that the board of directors maintains excellent communication with the chief
engineers. Communication between the boardroom and the chief engineers is improved if some directors
belong to the same professional communities as the engineers who live in the surrounding region.
Theory emerging from this study suggests that board work can gain from social capital in local
communities of engineers where trust relations promote social learning. Probably, the yields of the social
capital help to attract financiers; even if a part hereof must be allocated to compensate the skilled workers
for not abandoning the firm. The gains increase if board members are recruited from the same region as the
company attracts and generates knowledge, where the directors share social networks that provide dense
information flows. An additional condition is the presence of a substantial number of companies in the
region that share the same pool of knowledge. Yet, to make full use of social ties and trust relationships,
D1 and D2 cannot be very large. It makes sense that the use of social capital for obtaining knowledge
from the pool is optimized if the location of the residencies of the directors coincides with the labour
market area of the technical personnel. The advantage of coincidence increases if there are directors with
education in engineering, who belong to the same professional communities as the technical personal.
It is likely that Vestas Wind Systems has exceeded the critical distance for full use of the social capital,
while in the case of Wincon the distance has been too small (see table 5). Indeed, Bonus Energi had a
low D1D2 value, and small D1 and D2. The inability to gain from social capital may have prevented the
engineers at Bonus Energi from developing the type D turbine concept before the takeover by Siemens.
The realistic view is that the development of this advanced concept demands specific capabilities in the
area of power electronics that Siemens has. Siemens recognized that part of its core competencies could
be applied to wind turbines and Bonus Energi became the target of a diversification in related industries
where pre-entry experience of an entrant influences the evolution of an industry (Bauenstorf 2006). With
the introduction of the type D turbine concept, the technological foundation of Bonus Energi changed,
which will likely cut the technological ties with the place where the company was headquartered. It seems,
in the case of diversification in related industries, as if the technological capabilities of the target become
dependent on external sources, and the corporate governance system becomes dependent on outside
monitoring, which altogether reduces the advantages of recruiting board directors locally.
For companies with foreign owners, the distance between Danish board members decreased immediately
after control was transferred to the foreigners, which supports the idea that remote owners are attracted
if members of the corporate board are well acquainted with local conditions. This pattern does not apply
to Siemens Wind Power after Siemens’ buyout of Bonus Energi. Siemens acquired a turbine producer
with a board of directors living in close proximity to the factory. Nevertheless, Siemens replaced them
with external board members. One conclusion is that Siemen’s aspiration for technological leadership
effectively marginalized the board, which lost its role as strategic adviser. In this situation, the local
affiliation of board members is of minor importance.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Our objective is to examine how corporate governance changes over time when properties of the geographic
location commit companies to certain governance structures. Kogut and Walker (2001) examine German
ownership groups originating from regional networks, where local banks have an important role. These
groups, which are robust and resist competitive pressure, emerge from micro-behavior by investors acting
strategically (Kogut 2012). While their findings that strategizing actors are regional or local rest on a solid
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foundation, the proposal that governance is resistant to changes need to be revised when technological
competition influences strategic actions. The case study of the Danish wind turbine production is a story
about how ownership groups are driven by technological competition. The empirical evidence is a number
of buyouts orchestrated by groups of owners that initiated a technological race in the beginning of 1990s.
Empirical evidence shows that the number of engineers employed increases significantly because of these
buyouts (section 4.2). One consequence of the shareholders concern about innovation management was a
change in board structures as engineers began to have chairs on the boards making the conversational
exchange more efficient (section 4.3).
It can be argued using case evidence that after the initial stage of the industrial life cycle, when the
internal technological resources are still scarce, technological competition is intensified. Board structures
change from serving accountability functions towards fulfilling enterprise aspects and to represent diverse
stakeholders. The new governance resembles the process-oriented boardroom cultures discussed by Huse
and Gabrielsson (2008) that facilitate efficient conversational exchange.
There is reason to believe that owners encouraging changes in governance also become adept at
adopting new board structures. Instead, according to a perspective taking shape in this article, the
shareholders and managers have significant problems in relating to information about the new technology,
which makes the organizing of the governance difficult. The case of wind turbine production provides
examples of what Kogut and Walker (2001) call “technological beliefs” that spur owners and managements
to prepare companies for forthcoming technological competition. Evidence shows periods before significant
buyouts in which the number of engineers employed increases to fulfill beliefs about high corporate
technological quality. From this emerging perspective, teams of owners and managers have paramount
problems in understanding technological information they receive, which influences the decisions about
appropriate governance structures for suitable innovation management. The case study reveals board
structures that provide for communicative exchange between directors, who hold degrees in economics
and directors holding degrees in engineering. Yet, they appear only after the number of engineers involved
in R&D has begun to grow, and the need of engineers in the boardrooms to deal with technological
information arises.
Awareness about the importance of knowledge conditions of technology that influence corporate
governance is raised in studies by Reid and Smith (2008), Audretsch and Fritsch (2002) and Audretsch
(1995). Further extension of this perspective on governance in this case study looks promising. It leads to
a better understanding of the underlying mechanism of the “small worlds” of stratigizing actors in Kogut
and Walker (2001)and Kogut (2012). Although the case evidence shows that governance structures are
sensitive to changes, the geographic affiliations of the “small worlds” turned out to be resistant to changes.
The question about why the geographic affiliation is resistant can be answered using ideas from the
team production theory of the firm about boards as coordinating bodies responsible for maximizing the
wealth-creating potential of companies (Machold et. al. 2011), (Huse & Gabrielsson 2008) and (Blair 1998).
Maximization requires efficient communicative exchange in the boardrooms about the representation
and the protection of a diverse set of stakeholders in and around the company. This communication is
associated with adverse (technological) knowledge conditions as highlighted in this article. It turns out that
ownership groups respond to these conditions by recruiting directors in places, where the value-creating
technical workers live. The perspective taking shape that board work can take advantage of directors
living in proximity to the place where the company generates and attracts technological knowledge is
supported by established thinking in geography. According to this thinking technological knowledge is
immobile over long distances and is often personified by employees who move between working places in
a regional labour market. The latter knowledge condition implies that firm-specific knowledge can be
used by several companies located to the same place (Asheim & Gertler 2006; Fosfuri & Rønde 2004;
Werker & Athreye 2004).
For wind turbine production, ownership groups have sometimes neglected the importance of board
members’ proximity to locations where companies generate or obtain technological knowledge, but in these
cases the companies have either been outcompeted or have been taken over by other turbine producers.
Yet, emerging theory reveals that the need of coincidence between the place, where the company mobilizes
technological knowledge, and the place of residence of the board members varies with type of ownership
group. Coincidence is particularly common among companies with foreign owners. However, in case
of a new owner has specific pre-entry experience, such as Siemens that took over Bonus Energi, the
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technological ties between a target company and a place can be cut creating a dependency on outside
control.
This study also contributes to prior research challenging the accountability perspective on corporate
governance (Filatotchev & Wright 2005; Rajan & Zingales 2000; Short et. al. 1999). Our observations
of buyouts support the theory that innovation management plays a vital role for owners investing in a
company. With its focus on buyouts, the case study also challenges an idea by Allen and Gale (1998) that
outside owners are passive with regard to competition in the product market, which they consider as
orchestrated by entrepreneurial management teams. Our empirical evidence suggests that owners are
active and investments are motivated by deliberations on competition. This finding also casts light on how
time influences ties between the geographic location and companies’ governance structures. According to
case evidence investor concern about innovation management is less significant at the earlier stages of the
industrial life cycle (the accountability perspective of corporate governance dominates at these stages).
Therefore, we propose an idea that owners assign high value to board members’ proximity to firm-specific
knowledge after some time of the life cycle has elapsed. The perspective on the time pattern taking shape
supports research by Yamamura et al. (2005) showing significant technological changes at later stages of
the life cycle. This perspective challenges views that a dominant technological design appears early, while
the number of innovations decreases later on (Kaplan et. al. 2009), (Klepper 1996), (Cohen & Klepper
1992), (Gort & Klepper 1982). From the theory emerging in this article, it is evident that innovation
management is an important aspect of owner control at the late stage of the industrial life cycle. Under
these circumstances owners request a close relationship between board members and the place where the
firm-specific knowledge is developed, which questions the idea that corporate control, due to conditions of
financing, moves from insiders to external, independent directors (see Clark (2007)).
The findings of the current study are summarized in figure 1. It shows how governance changes over
the industrial life cycle with intensified technological competition as a critical watershed. Even if the board
members seem to be recruited in the neighborhood of the companies irrespectively competitive stage,
the watershed implies a change in requirements to board composition and a corresponding change in the
board-place connections. The study raises new interesting questions, but it also has some shortcomings
to be addressed in future research. While we explored how changes in corporate governance are related
to geographic factors, we concentrated on board structures but neglected other governance institutions.
For instance, case evidence suggests that ownership structure can be crucial in answering the research
question, firstly because this institution probably affects the role of geographic proximity. Secondly, type
of ownership structure impacts the role of the board, sometimes by cutting its ties with a certain place.
Another reason for why the findings may not be exhaustive is related to limitations of the data. It is true
that a single-case study is particularly suitable for illuminating and extending the logical relationships
between innovations, places and the evolution of corporate governance, but possibilities for generalizability
are reduced. Further research could examine multiple industries that rely on different types of technology.
Such examinations increase the understanding of to what extent the results depend on companies’ rate of
human capital accumulation, which varies across industries.
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